Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 135, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 35-67

  Khalil, Fahad ^a   Martimort, David ^b   Parigi, Bruno ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Common agency; Costly state verification; Monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250644433     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.010     Document Type: Article

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