Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 111, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 88-109

  Peters, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444284565     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00130-3     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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