The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring, and loan rates

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 58-86

  Carletti, Elena ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Loan rates; Monitoring; Multiple bank lending; Single bank lending; Small business lending

Indexed keywords

EID: 0742304045     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2003.04.001     Document Type: Article

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