Loan size as a commitment device

International Economic Review

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 135-150

  Khalil, Fahad ^a   Parigi, Bruno M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040676683     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527234     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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