Common agency with horizontally differentiated principals

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 323-345

  Mezzetti, Claudio ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031520376     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555808     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. ARNOLD, V.I. Ordinary Differential Equations. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973.
2. BERNHEIM, B.D. AND WHINSTON, M.D. "Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 (1985), pp. 269-281.
3. _ AND _. "Common Agency." Econometrica, Vol. 54 (1986), pp. 923-943.
4. _ AND _. "Exclusive Dealing." Mimeo, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1992.
5. BIGLAISER, G. AND MEZZETTI, C. "Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 61 (1993), pp. 302-330.
6. BOND, E.W. AND GRESIK, T.A. "Regulation of Multinational Firms with Two Active Governments: A Common Agency Approach." Mimeo, Department of Economics, Penn State University, 1993.
7. FEENSTRA, R.C. AND LEWIS, T.R. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure." Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 106 (1991), pp. 1287-1307.
8. FRAYSSE, J. "Common Agency: Existence of an Equilibrium in the Case of Two Outcomes." Econometrica, Vol. 61 (1993), pp. 1225-1229.
9. GAL-OR, E. "A Common Agency with Incomplete Information." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22 (1991), pp. 274-286.
10. GROSSMAN, S. AND HART, O. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem." Econometrica, Vol. 51 (1983), pp. 7-45.
11. GUESNERIE, R. AND LAFFONT, J.-J. "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25 (1984), pp. 329-370.
12. HAMILTON, J.H. AND THISSE, J.F. "Nonlinear Pricing in a Differentiated Oligopoly." Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Florida, 1993.
13. HOLMSTRÖM, B. "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10 (1979), pp. 74-91.
14. _ AND MILGROM, P. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7 (Special Issue 1991), pp. 24-52.
15. IVALDI, M. AND MARTIMORT, D. "Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing." Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, Vol. 34 (1994), pp. 72-114.
16. LEWIS, T.R. AND SAPPINGTON, D.E.M. "Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 49 (1989), pp. 294-313.
17. MARTIMORT, D. "Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Selection." Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, Vol. 28 (1992), pp. 1-38.
18. _. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27 (1996), pp. 1-31.
19. SPULBER, D.F. "Product Variety and Competitive Discounts." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 48 (1989), pp. 510-525.
20. STOLE, L.A. "Mechanism Design Under Common Agency." Mimeo, University of Chicago, 1991.
21. _. "Oligopoly and Product Quality." Mimeo, University of Chicago, 1992.
22. WILLIAMSON, O. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985.