Contractual externalities and common agency equilibria

Advances in Theoretical Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2003, Pages

  Martimort, David ^a   Stole, Lars ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Common agency; Contracting externality; Equilibrium selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 14844351344     PISSN: 15345963     EISSN: 15345963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1037     Document Type: Article

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