The efficient allocation of consumption under moral hazard and hidden access to the credit market

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 3, Issue 2-3, 2005, Pages 370-381

  Ábrahám, Árpád ^a   Pavoni, Nicola ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957292880     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.370     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Abraham, Arpad and Nicola Pavoni (2004a). "Efficient Allocation with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending." Working Paper, Duke University.
2. Abraham, Arpad and Nicola Pavoni (2004b). The First-Order Approach in Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending: The Two-Period Case. Working paper, University College London.
3. Allen, Franklin (1985). Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship with Lending and Borrowing. Economic Letter, 17, 27-31.
4. Altug, Sumru and Robert A. Miller (1990). Household Choices in Equilibrium. Economet-rica, 58, 543-570.
5. Attanasio, Orazio P. (1999). "Consumption." In Handbook of Macroeconomics, edited by J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford. Elsevier.
6. Attanasio, Orazio and Steve J. Davis (1996). Relative Wage Movements and the Distribution of Consumption. Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1227-1262.
7. Attanasio, Orazio P. and Nicola Pavoni (2004). "Testing Private Information Models with Asset Accumulation." Working paper, University College London.
8. Campbell, John and Angus Deaton (1989). Why is Consumption so Smooth? Review of Economic Studies, 56, 357-374.
9. Cole, Harold L. and Narayana R. Kocherlakota (2001). Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage. Review of Economic Studies, 68(3), 523-542.
10. Flavin, Marjorie (1981). The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations about Future Income. Journal ofPolitical Economy, 89, 971-987.
11. Gall, Jordi (1991). Budget Constraints and Time-Series Evidence on Consumption. American Economic Review, 81, 1238-1253.
12. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1983). An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 51, 7-45.
13. Hansen, Lars P., William Roberds, and Thomas J. Sargent (1991). Time Series Implications of Present Value Budget Balance and of Martingale Models of Consumption and Taxes. In Rational Expectations Econometrics, edited by L.P. Hansen and T.J. Sargent. Boulder: Westview.
14. Ligon, Ethan (1998). Risk Sharing and information in Village Economies. Review of Eco-nomic Studies, 65, 847-864.
15. Mace, Barbara J. (1991). Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 928-956.
16. Nelson, Julie A. (1994). On Testing for Full Insurance using Expenditure Survey Data. Journal of Political Economy, 102, 384-394.
17. Rogerson, William (1985). Repeated Moral Hazard. Econometrica, 53, 69-76.
18. West, Kenneth D. (1988). The Insensivity of Consumption to News about Income. Journal of Monetary Economics, 21, 17-34.