Erratum: "Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players" (Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2004) vol. 54 (585-607) 10.1016/j.jebo.2002.10.003);Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 585-607

  Rapoport, Amnon ^a   Amaldoss, Wilfred ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adaptive learning; All pay auctions; Bounded rationality; Mixed strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 3342942572     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.001     Document Type: Erratum

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