Bid costs and endogenous bid caps

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 709-722

  Gavious, Arieh ^a   Moldovanu, Benny ^b   Sela, Aner ^a  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036991059     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087482     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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