Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

European Economic Review

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 297-315

  Weymark, Diana N ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank conservatism; Central bank independence; Inflation bias; Liberal central banker

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; INDEPENDENCE; INFLATION; MONETARY POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 33846335231     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.01.005     Document Type: Article

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