The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 397-411

  Eijffinger, Sylvester C W ^a,b   Hoeberichts, Marco ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 14844286628     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028653     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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