Two fallacies concerning central-bank independence

American Economic Review

Volumn 85, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 207-211

  McCallum, Bennett T ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85017031297     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (14)

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