Heterogeneity in a currency union with social market objectives

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 129-152

  Hughes Hallett, Andrew ^a   Weymark, Diana N ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Currency union; EMU; Preference asymmetries; Transmission asymmetries

Indexed keywords

CURRENCY; EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION; FISCAL POLICY; MONETARY POLICY;

EID: 33645984548     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2005.00373.x     Document Type: Article

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