Independent monetary policies and social equity

Economics Letters

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 103-110

  Hughes Hallett, Andrew ^a   Weymark, Diana N ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank conservatism; Income redistribution; Monetary independence; Monetary policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344649391     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.025     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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5. Hughes Hallett A. Weymark D.N. Policy games and the optimal design of central banks Minford P. (Ed.). Money Matters: Essays in Honour of Alan Walters 2004 251-279 Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK
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10. Weymark D.N. 2001. "Inflation, income redistribution, and optimal central bank independence." Working Paper No. 01-W02R, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.