Ownership, incentives, and the hold-up problem

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 276-299

  Baldenius, Tim ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846168488     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00016.x     Document Type: Article

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