A model of negotiated transfer pricing

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 349-384

  Vaysman, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; C72; D82; Decentralization; L23; M41; Negotiated transfer pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000681481     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00029-9     Document Type: Article

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