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Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 909-930

Delegated Investment Decisions and Private Benefits of Control

Author keywords

Capital budgeting; Empire building; Hurdle rates; Residual income

Indexed keywords


EID: 0242595950     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.909     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (52)

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