Ex post inefficiencies in a property rights theory of the firm

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 125-147

  Matouschek, Niko ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344575783     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh026     Document Type: Review

References (32)

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