Negotiated transfer pricing and divisional vs. firm-wide performance evaluation

Accounting Review

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 87-104

  Anctil, Regina M ^a   Dutta, Sunil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Hold up problem; Investment; Performance evaluation; Transfer pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033433344     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.1999.74.1.87     Document Type: Review

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