Strategic Play and Adaptive Learning in the Sealed-Bid Bargaining Mechanism

Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Volumn 42, Issue 2-3, 1998, Pages 133-166

  Daniel, Terry E ^b   Seale, Darryl A ^a   Rapoport, Amnon ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038709220     PISSN: 00222496     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jmps.1998.1220     Document Type: Article

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