Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 1897-1945

  Ausubel, Lawrence M ^a   Cramton, Peter ^a   Deneckere, Raymond J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

asymmetric information; bargaining; Coase Conjecture; incomplete information; private information; sequential bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649306602     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03013-8     Document Type: Review

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