Information technology and optimal firm structure

Journal of Accounting Research

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 297-328

  Ziv, Amir ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034257389     PISSN: 00218456     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2672935     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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