Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation

Review of Accounting Studies

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 463-493

  Davila, Antonio ^a,b   Penalva, Fernando ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b IESE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Performance measurement

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751170660     PISSN: 13806653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-006-9018-8     Document Type: Article

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