Rent seeking and rent setting with asymmetric effectiveness of lobbying

Public Choice

Volumn 99, Issue 3-4, 1999, Pages 275-298

  Kohli, Inderjit ^b   Singh, Nirvikar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033421825     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018386223790     Document Type: Article

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