Coalitional rationalizability

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 121, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 903-929

  Ambrus, Attila ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746627222     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.121.3.903     Document Type: Review

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