Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-31

  Gul, Faruk ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030191545     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0073     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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