On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 122-139

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Le Breton, Michel ^b   Weber, Shlomo ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000675817     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2481     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Aumann R. J. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games. 1959;Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton.
2. Bernheim D., Whinston M. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quart. J. Econ. 101:1986;1-31.
3. Bernheim D., Peleg B., Whinston M. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I. concepts. J. Econ. Theory. 42:1987;1-12.
4. Greenberg J. On the sensitivity of Von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individually stable bargaining set. Int. J. Game Theory. 1992;41-55.
5. Konishi H., Le Breton M., Weber S. Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers. Econ. Theory. 9:1997;97-113.
6. D. Laussel, M. Le Breton, The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency, Greqam, Université de la Méditérranée, 1995.
7. Moulin H. Serial cost-sharing of excludable public goods. Rev. Econ. Stud. 61:1994;305-325.
8. H. Moulin, Incremental cost-sharing: Characterization by coalition-strategy proofness, Department of Economics, Duke University, 1996.