Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 339-357

  Xue, Licun ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Coalition; Nash equilibrium; Negotiation; Perfect foresight; Self enforcing agreement

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034346934     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820000044     Document Type: Article

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