Equilibrium binding agreements

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 30-78

  Ray, Debraj ^a,b   Vohra, Rajiv ^c,d  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

^c BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031094130     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2236     Document Type: Article

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