Rationalizable and coalition proof shareholder tendering strategies in corporate takeovers

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 269-291

  Noe, Thomas H ^a,b  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Coalition proof; Free rider problem; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649085140     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008333916568     Document Type: Article

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