Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case

Economics Letters

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 165-171

  Bester, Helmut ^a   Strausz, Roland ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; C72; D82; Limited commitment; Mechanism design; Revelation principle

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034393899     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00301-3     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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