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Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 183-204

Partisan and bipartisan signaling in congress

(1)  Epstein, David a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0032219106     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/14.2.183     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (25)

References (17)
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    • (1993) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.4 , pp. 133-152
    • Austen-Smith, D.1
  • 3
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    • Equilibrium selection in signaling games
    • _, and Joel Sobel. 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," 55 Econometrica 647-61.
    • (1987) Econometrica , vol.55 , pp. 647-661
    • Sobel, J.1
  • 4
    • 0001139863 scopus 로고
    • Signaling games and stable equilibria
    • Cho, In-Koo, and David Kreps. 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," 102 Quarterly Journal of Economics 179-221.
    • (1987) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.102 , pp. 179-221
    • Cho, I.-K.1    Kreps, D.2
  • 5
    • 84971138815 scopus 로고
    • Institutional context and leadership style: The house from Cannon to Rayburn
    • Cooper, Joseph, and David Brady. 1981. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," 75 American Political Science Review 411-25.
    • (1981) American Political Science Review , vol.75 , pp. 411-425
    • Cooper, J.1    Brady, D.2
  • 7
    • 0000510636 scopus 로고
    • Strategic information transmission
    • Crawford, Vincent, and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," 50 Econometrica 1431-51.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 1431-1451
    • Crawford, V.1    Sobel, J.2
  • 8
    • 0031530326 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power
    • Epstein, David. 1997. "An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power," 91 Public Choice 271-99.
    • (1997) Public Choice , vol.91 , pp. 271-299
    • Epstein, D.1
  • 9
    • 21844494533 scopus 로고
    • A theory of strategic oversight: Congress, lobbyists and the bureaucracy
    • _, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1995. "A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists and the Bureaucracy," 11 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 227-55.
    • (1995) Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization , vol.11 , pp. 227-255
    • O'Halloran, S.1
  • 11
    • 77958410355 scopus 로고
    • Collective decision-making and standing committees: An informational rational for restrictive amendment procedures
    • Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rational for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," 3 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 287-335.
    • (1987) Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization , vol.3 , pp. 287-335
    • Gilligan, T.1    Krehbiel, K.2
  • 12
    • 84935509181 scopus 로고
    • Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee
    • _. 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee," 33 American Journal of Political Science 459-90.
    • (1989) American Journal of Political Science , vol.33 , pp. 459-490
  • 16
    • 0004035701 scopus 로고
    • Chicago: University of Chicago Press
    • Shepsle, Kenneth. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    • (1978) The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle
    • Shepsle, K.1


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