Is full compliance possible?: Conditions for shirking with imperfect monitoring and continuous action spaces

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 347-375

  Bednar, Jenna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Compliance; Cooperation; Folk theorem; Imperfect information

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745306873     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629806065012     Document Type: Article

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