Judicial predictability and federal stability: Strategic consequences of institutional imperfection

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 423-446

  Bednar, Jenna ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b Institute for Social Research   (United States)

^c Center for Political Studies   (United States)

Author keywords

Federalism; Game theory; Institutional analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 7644244576     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629804046149     Document Type: Review

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