Moral hazard and private monitoring

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 16-39

  Bhaskar, V ^a   Van Damme, Eric ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b CentER for Economic Research   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Mixed strategies; Private monitoring; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036167002     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2861     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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10. On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
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24. Multi-stage games with communication
25. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and uniformly inefficient equilibria
26. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge
27. Efficiency in the prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring