Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 10-25

  Kendal, Jeremy ^a   Feldman, Marcus W ^a   Aoki, Kenichi ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Cultural drift; Cultural evolution; Metanorm; Norm adoption; Punishment

Indexed keywords

ADOPTION BEHAVIOR; COEVOLUTION; FREQUENCY ANALYSIS; MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS; STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTION;

ARTICLE; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; HUMAN; MONTE CARLO METHOD; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STATISTICAL MODEL;

CULTURAL EVOLUTION; CULTURE; HUMANS; MODELS, STATISTICAL; MONTE CARLO METHOD; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 33744504943     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: 10960325     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2006.01.003     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Aoki K. Altruism may be sexy-comment on cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 53 1 (2004) 37-40
2. Axelrod R. An evolutionary approach to norms. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 80 4 (1986) 1095-1111
3. Axelrod R. The dissemination of culture: a model with local convergence and global polarization. J. Conflict. Resol. 41 2 (1997) 203-226
4. Bowles S., and Gintis H. The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theor. Popul. Biol. 65 (2004) 17-28
5. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
6. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol. Sociobiol. 13 3 (1992) 171-195
7. Boyd R., and Richerson P.J. Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population. J. Theor. Biol. 215 3 (2002) 287-296
8. Boyd R., Gintis H., Bowles S., and Richerson P.J. The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 100 6 (2003) 3531-3535
9. Brandt H., Hauert C., and Sigmund K. Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. London B 270 (2003) 1099-1104
10. Cavalli-Sforza L.L., and Feldman M.W. Cultural transmission and evolution, a quantitative approach. Monographs in Population Biology vol. 16 (1981), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
11. Coyne J.A., Barton N.H., and Turelli M. Perspective, a critique of Sewall Wright's shifting balance theory of evolution. Evolution 51 3 (1997) 643-671
12. Daly M., and Wilson M. Homicide (1988), Aldine de Gruyter, New York
13. Fessler D.M.T., and Navarrete C.D. Meat is good to taboo. Dietary proscriptions as a product of the interaction of psychological mechanisms and social processes. J. Cognit. Culture 3 1 (2003) 1-40
14. Fehr E., and Fischbacher U. The nature of human altruism. Nature 425 (2003) 785-791
15. Fowler J.H. Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 102 19 (2005) 7047-7049
16. Hammel E.A., McDaniel C.K., and Wachter K.W. Demographic consequences of incest tabus: a microsimulation analysis. Science 205 (1979) 972-977
17. Hauert C., De Monte S., Hofbauer J., and Sigmund K. Replicator dynamics for optional public good games. J. Theor. Biol. 218 2 (2002) 187-194
18. Henrich J. Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 53 1 (2004) 3-35
19. Henrich J., and Boyd R. Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol. 208 (2001) 79-89
20. Hofbauer J., and Sigmund K. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (1998), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
21. Knauft B.M. Violence and sociality in human evolution. Curr. Anthropol. 32 4 (1991) 391-428
22. McAdams R.H. The origin, development, and regulation of norms. Mich. Law Rev. 96 2 (1997) 338-433
23. Nagylaki T. Introduction to Theoretical Population Genetics (1992), Springer, Berlin, New York
24. Nakamaru, M., Iwasa, Y., in press. The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher. J. Theor. Biol.
25. Nakamaru M., and Levin S.A. Spread of two linked social norms on complex interaction networks. J. Theor. Biol. 230 1 (2004) 57-64
26. Sapir E. Language (1921), Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York
27. Sethi R., and Somanathan E. The evolution of social norms in common property resource use. Am. Econ. Rev. 86 4 (1996) 766-788
28. Schlag K.H. Why imitate, and if so how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits. J. Econ. Theory 78 1 (1998) 130-156
29. Sigmund K., Hauert C., and Nowak M.A. Reward and punishment. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 98 19 (2001) 10757-10762
30. Weibull J.W. Evolutionary Game Theory (1995), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
31. Wright S. Evolution in Mendelian populations. Genetics 10 (1931) 97-159
32. Wright S. The roles of mutation, inbreeding, crossbreeding and selection in evolution. Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress on Genetics vol. 1 (1932) 356-366
33. Wright S. Genic and organismic selection. Evolution 34 5 (1980) 825-843