Lobbying and compromise

Public Choice

Volumn 126, Issue 3-4, 2006, Pages 317-330

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645574593     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-7508-7     Document Type: Article

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