Political culture and monopoly price determination

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-19

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041917139     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0198-x     Document Type: Article

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