Strategic restraint in contests

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 201-210

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Endogenous lobbying targets; Interest groups; Polarization; Voluntary restraint

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; PLANNING THEORY; STRATEGIC APPROACH; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 0942291291     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00261-1     Document Type: Article

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