The electoral politics of extreme policies

Economic Journal

Volumn 108, Issue 451, 1998, Pages 1677-1685

  Glazer, Amihai ^a   Gradstein, Mark ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003213740     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00366     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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