Partner selection in public goods experiments

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 356-378

  Coricelli, Giorgio ^a   Fehr, Dietmar ^b   Fellner, Gerlinde ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^b INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (United States)

^c MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Partner selection; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 2542512314     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704264143     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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