Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 294-302

  Alcalde, José ^a   Romero Medina, Antonio ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008924966     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0743     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Alcalde, J. (1996). "Implementation of Stable Solutions to the Marriage Problem," J. Econom. Theory 69, 240-254.
2. Alcalde, J., and Barberà, S. (1994). "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Econom. Theory 4, 417-435.
3. Alcalde, J., Pérez-Castrillo, D., and Romero-Medina, A. (1998). "Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations," J. Econom. Theory 82, 469-480.
4. Gale, D., and Shapley L. S. (1962). "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," Am. Math. Monthly 69, 9-15.
5. Jackson, M. O. (1992). "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Rev. Econom. Stud. 59, 757-775.
6. Kara, T., Sönmez, T. (1997) "Implementation of College Admission Rules," Econom. Theory 9, 197-218.
7. Romero-Medina, A. (1998). "Implementation of Stable Solutions in a Restricted Matching Market." Rev. Econom. Design 3, 137-147.
8. Roth, A. E. (1982). "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Math. Oper. Res. 7, 617-628.
9. Roth, A. E. (1985). "The College Admissions Problem Is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem," J. Econom. Theory 36, 277-288.
10. Roth, A. E., and Sotomayor, M. (1990). Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.