Nash implementation of matching rules

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 425-439

  Kara, Tarik ^a   Sönmez, Tayfun ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030079296     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0024     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. 1. J. ALCALDE, Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems, mimeo, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1993, J. Econ. Theory, in press.
2. 2. V. DANILOV, Implementation via Nash equilibria, Econometrica 60 (1992), 43-56.
3. 3. G. DEMANGE, D. GALE, AND M. SOTOMAYOR, A further note on the stable matching problem, Discrete Appl. Math. 16 (1987), 217-222.
4. 4. B. DUTTA AND A. SEN, A necessary and sufficient condition of two-person Nash implementation, Rev. Econ. Stud. 58 (1991), 121-128.
5. 5. D. GALE AND L. SHAPLEY, College admissions and the stability of marriage, Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962), 9-15.
6. 6. D. GALE AND M. SOTOMAYOR, Ms. Machiavelli and the stable matching problem, Amer. Math. Monthly 92 (1985), 261-268.
7. 7. D. GALE AND M. SOTOMAYOR, Some remarks on the stable matching problem, Discrete Appl. Math. 11 (1985), 223-232.
8. 8. D. KNUTH, "Marriages stables," Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, Montréal, 1976.
9. 9. E. MASKIN, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, mimeo, MIT, 1977.
10. 10. E. MASKIN, The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: A survey, "Social Goals and Social Organization: Volume in Memory of Elisha Pazner" (L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein, Eds.), Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, 1985.
11. 11. J. MOORE, Implementation in environments with complete information, "Advances in Economic Theory" (J.-J. Laffont, Ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, 1992.
12. 12. J. MOORE AND R. REPULLO, Nash implementation: A full characterization, Econometrica 58 (1990), 1083-1099.
13. 13. A. E. ROTH, The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982), 617-628.
14. 14. A. E. ROTH, The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory, J. Polit. Econ. 92 (1984), 991-1016.
15. 15. A. E. ROTH, Misrepresentation and stability in marriage problems, J. Econ. Theory 34 (1984), 383-387.
16. 16. A. E. ROTH, Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets, Europ. Econ. Rev. 27 (1985), 75-96.
17. 17. A. E. ROTH, A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for near physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom, Amer. Econ. Rev. 81 (1991), 415-440.
18. 18. A. E. ROTH AND M. SOTOMAYOR, "Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis," Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, 1990.
19. 19. T. SAIJO, Strategy space reduction in Maskin's theorem: Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988), 693-700.
20. 20. A. SEN, Approximate implementation of non-dictatorial social choice functions, mimeo, Princeton University, 1987.
21. 21. T. SJOSTROM, On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation, Soc. Choice Welfare 8 (1991), 333-340.
22. 22. K. TADENUMA, Maskin monotonicity in matching problems, mimeo, University of Rochester, 1993.
23. 23. W. THOMSON, Minimal monotonic extensions, mimeo, University of Rochester, 1992.
24. 24. W. THOMSON, Concepts of implementation, mimeo, University of Rochester, 1993.
25. 25. M. TODA, Another characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems, Discus" sion Paper 9303, Tokyo Keizai University, 1993.
26. 26. T. YAMATO, On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences, Games Econ. Behav. 4 (1992), 484-992.