Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem revisited: Strategic issues and applications

Management Science

Volumn 47, Issue 9, 2001, Pages 1252-1267

  Teo, Chung Piaw ^a,b   Sethuraman, Jay ^a,b   Tan, Wee Peng ^a,b  

^a Fu Foundation School of Engineering and Applied Science   (United States)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Gale Shapley Algorithm; Stable Marriage; Strategic Issues; Student Posting Exercise

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EDUCATION; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

STRATEGIC ISSUES;

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

EID: 0035466682     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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6. Stable marriage and indifference
7. Nash implementation of matching rules
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10. The average number of stable matchings
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12. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
13. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching
14. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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17. Truncation strategies in matching markets: In search of advice for participants
18. Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
19. Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
20. The geometry of fractional stable matching and its applications