Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation: A numerical analysis of a contest success function model

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 329-352

  Bodenstein, Martin ^a   Ursprung, Heinrich W ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444446920     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2051-5     Document Type: Article

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