Externalities vs internalities: A model of political integration

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 251-268

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Centralization; H11; H73; Integration; Jurisdictions; Public goods; The State

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000979048     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00090-X     Document Type: Article

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