Politicians' preferences on local tax rates: An empirical analysis

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 479-502

  Ashworth, John ^a   Heyndels, Bruno ^b  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Attitudes; Beliefs; Fiscal illusion; Interest groups; Mimicking; Tax choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031232033     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00015-3     Document Type: Article

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