Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model

American Economic Review

Volumn 87, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 977-992

  Kollman, Ken ^a   Miller, John H ^b   Page, Scott E ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001325337     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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