Exit, voice, and mimicking behavior: Evidence from Swiss cantons

Public Choice

Volumn 113, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 1-23

  Schaltegger, Christoph A ^a,b   Küttel, Dominique ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141787944     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020377207035     Document Type: Article

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