When is two better than one? How federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 99-119

  Caplan, Bryan ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D60; D72; H11; Imperfect political competition; Intergovernmental competition; Optimal federalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005718934     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00106-7     Document Type: Article

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